North Korea's ammunition fuels Putin's war machine

Senior Ukrainian defense officials and U.S. diplomats agree on one thing: North Korean arms sales to Russia are among the biggest threats to Kiev's ability to repel the Russian invasion.

Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the Ukrainian military intelligence chief, has called North Korea's non-stop munitions shipments to Russian ports in the Far East pose a direct threat to Ukrainian front lines thousands of miles to the west, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told last month at the United Nations Security Council that dealing with North Korean (and Iranian) arms sales to Russia should be a top priority for the UN body. And US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told This spring, lawmakers noted that weapons from countries like North Korea helped keep Russia's war going.

Criticism of North Korea's support for Moscow's war effort, which has been heard for two years, has doubled following the signing of a renewed defense pact between Russia and North Korea this summer.

There is ample open source evidence suggesting that thousands of shipping containers have left North Korean ports, docked in Russia and been loaded onto westbound trains since at least mid-2022. US State Department say analysts that at least 11,000 containers have arrived, apparently with ammunition. Budanov has found that results can be seen about a week after a new shipment arrives on the battlefield. While estimates of the exact number of North Korean artillery shells delivered vary widely, ranging from 1.6 million to nearly 6 million shells, experts believe that at least two million were sent to Russia this summer, although many of them were old, damaged or were defective in a certain way.

This raises a few questions: Why should the delivery be old and often unreliable North Korean artillery munitions posed one of the biggest threats to Ukraine's chances last year in a war fought by modern tanks, fighter jets, drones and air defense systems? And what exactly does North Korea get from this trade – just money, food and oil, or does it also receive advanced Russian military technology that could further strengthen dictator Kim Jong Un?

In other words, will the more worrying effects of the new Moscow-Pyongyang partnership be felt on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine or in the geopolitical landscape of Northeast Asia?

The grenades that North Korea provided to Russia are not first class (although the Ukrainian armed forces did not receive all cartridges from a hodgepodge of Western supplies). Experts who have analyzed a range of mortar and artillery shells used in war have found many munitions that are both old, worn or simply broken, with high dud rates and unreliable targeting.

“This is not high-value ordnance, but it is not the first place Russia wants to go” to get additional supplies, said Vann Van Diepen, a former U.S. State Department official and expert on North Korean weapons proliferation. Without them, however, it would be difficult to maintain the Russian style of fighting, especially in the third year of what was intended to be a blitzkrieg, he said.

“They would have to do this at a much lower intensity because their way of conquering territory is through large artillery barrages and the subsequent invasion,” Van Diepen added.

That's why large quantities of even low-quality weapons are a major concern for Ukrainian military leaders and the U.S. officials eager to help them stay in the fight. Russia has tried to increase its own domestic ammunition production, particularly artillery shells, but still cannot produce enough to meet the high rates of fire its armed forces require.

Particularly last year, when the Russian factories were still in the preparation phase, North Korean supplies “provided them with bridging capacity. North Korean artillery shells are not good, but when it comes to artillery ammunition, quantity has a quality of its own,” said Michael Kofman, senior fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Kofman estimated that North Korean supplies may have provided a significant portion of the shells fired from Russian barrels during that critical year, which “gave Russia an artillery fire advantage of at least 3 to 1 and more.” in some areas above Ukrainian forces, he said.

This type of advantage was particularly evident in the fierce fighting in southeastern Ukraine last year, when the United States and Europe have not fulfilled their own commitments to boost the production of artillery ammunition to supply the Ukrainian armed forces. On October 2, Russian forces finally attacked the Ukrainian city Vuhledar to submission after two years of resistance, potentially opening the door to further territorial gains for Moscow.

The other big question is what North Korea is comes out of business, beyond the deliveries of Eat And energy which the isolated regime desperately needs, especially after the economic devastation of the COVID-19 years and the ongoing impact of Western and United Nations sanctions.

It was an obvious victory for Pyongyang Russia blocked at the United Nations this spring, the renewal of the body that oversees enforcement of sanctions against North Korea's missile and nuclear programs; Closing that oversight program after 15 years in operation will likely make it even easier for North Korea to circumvent sanctions designed to limit its ability to develop long-range nuclear strike capability.

Another high-profile victory was the June victory between Russia and North Korea Defense pactessentially an updated version of a similar 1960s agreement between the Soviet Union and the then-nascent North Korea.

Some Experts believe that the pact offers less than one might think, considering that Russia's involvement in a North Korean war is unlikely.

But formalized military ties between the two countries, coming two years after increased arms shipments began to support Russia's war effort, have redoubled concerns in Washington about the emergence of a conflict lasting coalition anti-Western countries, including China and Iran. This informal grouping led to greater trade and arms transfers between all four members, which had implications both on the Ukrainian battlefield and beyond; Russia is allegedly Consideration is being given to supplying Iranian proxy forces in Yemen with advanced missiles to further disrupt shipping in the Red Sea.

Potentially much more worrisome, but much more difficult to determine, is the extent to which Russia is prepared to provide North Korea with advanced military technology. This has been a concern for the Biden White House long before the new mutual defense pact. The administration is particularly concerned about this transfer of fighter jets, tanks and missile technology, even though Moscow has done so delivery Pyongyang has had missile technology for decades. (And indeed the few dozen North Korean missiles used in Russian attacks on Ukraine this year appeared to be direct copies or derivatives of older Soviet designs.)

Since the intensification of the arms trade between the two countries became apparent, analysts have tried to do so determine which of the many articles Pyongyang's wish list could include offers from Russia, including satellite technology, missile guidance systems, intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems and even advanced submarine technology.

“What’s in it for North Korea? We just don't know. “The Russians didn’t really say they gave much,” Van Diepen said. “There is no real, solid information beyond food and oil. There is no concrete information regarding military technology transfers.”

The question is complicated because while North Korea's wish list may be extensive, its needs are even greater. Unlike China, which also hopes to benefit from its support for Russia's war through long-denied transfers of advanced technology, for North Korea almost all technology is advanced.

“North Korea could benefit from all sorts of things, not just nuclear technology. They have a huge need in the area of ​​conventional weapons and dual-use technologies – they could benefit from almost anything,” Van Diepen said.

A big fear is that the relationship will be repaired between Pyongyang and Moscow could Encourage Kim to act even more aggressively regionally than in recent years. Since the collapse of bilateral talks with the United States in 2019, there have been signs that Kim has jettisoned his decades-long family preference in favor of normalizing relations with the United States based on denuclearization, said Rachel Minyoung Lee, Korea- Expert at the Stimson Center. This became even clearer with a delay Speech 2023 by Kim, in which he essentially defined South Korea as a foreign country with which North Korea has belligerent relations.

“All of this happened in the midst of this blossoming relationship with the Russians, so it would be logical to assume that Russia was in the background of Kim's decision-making,” Lee said.

And there is something other than food, oil or technology that Kim could get from Russia: a semblance of international legitimacy. One of the little-noticed clauses in the June mutual defense pact, Lee noted, was Russia's support to help North Korea join international clubs such as BRICS, a group of countries (made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, etc.). , to be included (several recently added members), which is developing into an anti-Western ad hoc coalition.

The deeper relationship with Russia could also give Kim a chance to revive one of his grandfather's favorite plays: balancing China and Russia against each other. China dominates North Korea's trade and has acted as a check on Pyongyang's worst foreign policy excesses. Closer ties with and support from Moscow could give Kim room for a more adventurous foreign policy.

“At least in the short term, it makes sense for Kim to align more with Russia because Russia won't be worried about international sanctions or international norms and China won't go quite that far,” Lee said.

The problem is that, unlike in Kim Il Sung's time, China is not a junior partner with whom to balance. China's economic dominance over Russia has already become clear in the terms of the so-called “economic policies” of these two countries.no limits“Friendship, and it is Beijing that is keeping Moscow on tenterhooks.” This new power dynamic could ultimately serve as a brake on how much Russian support can help push North Korea in a dangerous direction, Lee said.

“I think China is mixed: They're not unhappy that Russia and North Korea are causing more headaches for Washington, but they're also concerned about how far this could go and that their influence over North Korea is weakening,” she said.